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ABSTRACT: When is an argument to be called one-sided? When is putting forward such an argument fallacious? 
How can we develop a model for critical discussion, such that a fallaciously one-sided argument corresponds to a 
violation of a discussion rule? These issues are dealt with within ‘the limits of the dialogue model of argument’ by 
specifying a type of persuasion dialogue in which an arguer can offer complex arguments to anticipate particular 
responses by a critic.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Extant models for critical discussion deal with rights and obligations to make relatively simple 
moves, such as challenging a single statement or offering an elementary argument. Some flaws 
within real argumentative discussion, however, cannot be pointed out by reference to a single 
discussion move at a particular stage of the dialogue, but need to be understood as a flaw in 
combining a number of dialectical moves. A case in point is the fallacious use of one-sided 
arguments. This paper aims to extend dialectical models in order to explicate one-sidedness. 
Frequently, arguers offer multifaceted arguments, as can be seen from televised debates 
or from disputes in the editorial pages. Such arguments deal with several sides of an issue in a 
single attempt to counter or anticipate numerous critical responses. If such an argument ignores 
relevant parts of the issue, it can be said to be one-sided. There are two prima facie grounds for 
considering one-sidedness legitimate. First, it is not feasible to deal with all parts of the issue and 
with all possible objections an antagonist might raise. Second, an arguer is often expected to 
represent one particular side of the issue and to deal with only those parts of the subject that 
make his or her case appear the stronger one. Notwithstanding these reasons for regarding one-
sidedness non-fallacious in at least some contexts, we require balanced argumentation for 
deciding what propositions or proposals merit our acceptance. From that perspective one-sided 
arguments do not satisfy our needs. In this paper we will examine a specification of the notion of 
a critical discussion that enables us define one-sided argument (sections 2 and 3) and to make a 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate cases (section 4). 
This paper contributes to the debate about the dialectical obligations that has been 
initiated by Johnson (for instance, Johnson 2000a, 2000b). In particular it elaborates Krabbe’s 
notion of a ‘[a]n argument for a thesis T [that] can reasonably convince a person X’ (2002, see 
also 2000). The obligation to argue in a balanced, not overly one-sided manner will be specified 
by formulating appropriate rules for critical discussion. In this way it will be shown how some of 
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Johnson’s undertakings in informal logic can be accommodated, unlike what Blair seems to 
expect, ‘within the limits of the dialogue model of argument’ (Blair, 1998). This result vindicates 
the dialectical approach to argumentation. 
 
2. ONE-SIDED ARGUMENTS 
 
Diverse dialectical notions can be said to be one-sided: arguments, standpoints, discussions, 
criticisms and bodies of evidence. This paper deals exclusively with one-sidedness in arguments. 
The expression one-sided may refer to two distinct, but closely related features of arguments. 
First it may connote bias, partiality, and the dealing with only one side of an issue, where side 
seems to mean ‘a position viewed as opposite to or contrasted with another’ (Webster’s). Second, 
it may indicate the dealing with one side of a subject, where side seems to mean ‘an aspect or 
part of something held to be contrasted with some other aspect or part’ (Webster’s). The 
expression one-sided can be correctly applied to an argument that deals with several aspects of 
the issue but not with all of them and also to an argument that responds to several alternative 
positions but not to all of them. In both cases the term is appropriate if the argument fails to 
account for parts of the issue or subject in a way that favors one party at the expense of others. 
Issues often have more than two sides in the sense of involving more than two contrary 
standpoints or positions. An argument remains imbalanced if it does contain a refutation of an 
implausible position while neglecting a more plausible alternative. Consequently, Govier takes 
the Two-Sides Model, ‘according to which fairness and lack of bias will result when both sides of 
an issue are presented by advocates’ to be wrong (1998, p. 44). However, we will simplify 
matters by focusing on arguments that are directed towards a particular antagonist. Given a 
single conflict of opinions there are two sides of the issue: the position of the protagonist and that 
of the antagonist. An arguer addressing a mixed audience must, from this perspective, be seen as 
being engaged in several discussions, each starting from a dispute with a particular antagonist. In 
the other sense of side, we may say that even a particular conflict may involve many sides: the 
issue can be approached from several angles, focusing on distinct aspects or parts of the subject 
matter. The sides of the subject can be identified with the critical questions that may plausibly 
arise throughout the discussion. When defining one-sidedness for argumentative contexts, we 
can stipulate the term to apply simultaneously to a failure to adequately deal with the position of 
one’s adversary as well as to a failure to adequately deal with at least part of the subject matter. 
For if the protagonist fails to deal with a side in the sense of failing to deal with a relevant critical 
question, he or she fails to deal with the antagonist’s position in an adequate way, and vice versa.  
In the following example, journalists allege that administration officers, by failing to 
represent counterevidence in an adequate manner, made a one-sided presentation in favor of the 
thesis that Saddam Hussein was rebuilding his nuclear weapons program.  
 
Example 
In 2002 U.S. Vice President Cheney showed so-called irrefutable evidence that Saddam Hussein 
was rebuilding his nuclear weapons program: the seizing of thousands of tubes supposedly 
destined for Iraqi uranium centrifuges. The White House’s theory that the tubes were for nuclear 
centrifuges was disputed by nuclear scientists, who considered the tubes, in comparison with 
actual centrifuge rotors too narrow, too thick, too shiny and too long. Moreover, the tubes 
seemed suitable for building rockets.  
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Senior administration officials repeatedly failed to fully disclose the contrary views of America’s leading 
nuclear scientists, an examination by The New York Times has found. They sometimes overstated the most 
dire intelligence assessments of the tubes, yet minimized or rejected the strong doubts of nuclear experts. 
(...) One result was a largely one-sided presentation to the public that did not convey the depth of evidence 
and argument against the administration’s most tangible proof of a revived nuclear weapons program in 
Iraq. (Barstow, Broad & Gerth, 2004, p. 1.1) 
 
Arguments said to be one-sided are typically complex cases that suggest to present a broad view 
on a controversial issue. Offering a complex argument is in two different, but systematically 
related ways connected to dialogue. First, an argument must be understood as a contribution to a 
discussion: arguments are typically used to persuade an audience. Second, an argument, even if 
constituted by only one standpoint and one supporting reason, is not a basic unit of analysis in 
dialectical theory. It is useful to understand such elementary arguments as implicit discussions, 
‘where the protagonist is speaking (or writing) and the role of the antagonist remains implicit’ 
(Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 59). By presenting an argument, a protagonist 
responds to or anticipates critical moves by antagonists in his audience. 
In an analogous way we may explicate the normative notion of a critical discussion in 
two directions. First, a critical discussion can be modeled as an exchange of contributions that 
can be dialectically complex, such as offering extensive criticisms and argumentative 
monologues or solo-arguments (Blair, 1998). The presentation of more intricate arguments, if not 
solo-arguments, has been modeled by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) and by Walton and 
Krabbe (1995). Second, we can choose to specify a critical discussion as an exchange of 
dialectically simple moves, like posing a single critical question or offering a single reason in 
support of a standpoint. This type of critical discussion is modeled by for instance Hamblin 
(1970) and Mackenzie (1990). When Blair classifies the ways that arguments can be complex, he 
contends that ‘at a certain stage in the increasing complexity of the argument turns, there is a 
qualitative change in the nature of the dialogue’ (1998, p. 327). Blair holds that the kind of rules 
that apply to solo-arguments must be different from the rules, such as the pragma-dialectical 
ones, that apply to duet arguments (p. 336). The account below accommodates Blair’s contention 
by proposing rules that are suitable for offering complex argumentation. Still, the rationale for 
this type of rule is entirely dialogical by requiring complex contribution to be constructed from 
dialogues that contain only dialectically simple moves. Within the limits of this dialogical 
framework we will explicate one-sidedness. 
 
3. TWO LAYERS OF CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
 
In order to account for one-sided arguments, a two-layered normative model for critical 
discussion called Constructive Critical Discussion will be proposed. The model specifies (a few 
elements from) reasonable discussion behavior in situations where it is opportune to make larger 
argumentative contributions, such as when exchanging arguments and criticisms via written 
media. 
The exchange of complex arguments constitutes the main layer of dialogue. During the 
exchange, the parties need to keep track of what speech act responds to what speech act. In 
addition, it should be clear what responses are anticipated by the arguer. For these reasons we 
will take a complex argument to presuppose one or more exchanges of individual speech acts. 
These exchanges form the second, underlying layer of dialogue. Each of these underlying 
dialogues is called a basic critical discussion, also to be referred to as basic discussion. Within a 
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constructive critical discussion (or: constructive discussion) the parties are constructing basic 
discussions in a systematic manner.1  
A constructive discussion starts from a conflict of opinions. We will restrict ourselves to 
non-mixed disputes, where one party defends a standpoint while the other party challenges the 
standpoint and the supporting arguments. Following pragma-dialectical terminology, the 
defending party is called the protagonist, the critical party the antagonist. The shared goal of 
protagonist and antagonist is to resolve their conflict, that is, to examine in a cooperative effort 
whether the antagonist should, given her starting points, give up her critical stance towards the 
standpoint in order to preserve a consistent position, or whether instead the protagonist should 
give up defending his standpoint vis-à-vis the antagonist with these particular starting points. A 
decision to resolve the dispute one way or another constitutes real resolution only if it is based on 
(what the parties perceive as) the merits of the case. To promote a discussion on the merits of the 
case, the parties must obey two basic dialectical rules (cf. Krabbe, 2002). 
First, each party is committed to achieve the individual aim of winning over the other 
side. Following this elemental rule promotes the final result to be based on a sufficiently 
complete overview of the pros and cons accounting for all relevant sides of the subject matter. 
Second, each party is obliged to leave the other party enough space to maneuver: one should not 
hinder or obstruct the other party in the attempt to achieve his or her individual aim, except by 
offering good arguments or relevant criticisms. What this basic rule amounts to in more detail is 
to be specified by the rules for discussion. Following the second basic rule promotes the final 
result to be based on relevant considerations only. 
Within one and the same turn in a constructive discussion, the protagonist may respond 
to several critical questions raised by the antagonist and he is allowed to anticipate a number of 
critical moves as well. The antagonist is allowed to respond to several defensive moves by the 
protagonist.2 The protagonist and antagonist do not fulfill their dialectical roles in a direct way. 
Instead, they are cooperating to construct one or more basic discussions. The end result of the 
constructive discussion as a whole depends on the end results of the basic discussions. 
A basic discussion resembles a constructive discussion, but differs by requiring every 
stage of the dialogue to contain exactly one single speech act. The parties in a basic discussion 
are called the proponent and opponent (these roles can be played both by the protagonist and the 
antagonist in a constructive discussion). The proponent and the opponent move alternately. The 
parties are supposed to use a language L, such that a, a1, a2,..., b, b1, b2,... are sentences of L 
and such that if S and T are sentences of L then, at least, so is S→T (S and T are used as variables 
for atomic or complex sentences of L). A sentence of the form S→T can function as a 
representation, called a connection premise, of the logically minimal justificatory connection 
between reasons and a conclusion. From the start of the dialogue there is a set of commitments 
associated with the opponent. This set contains sentences from L or is empty, and does not 
change during the discussion (a more refined view can be found in for instance Mackenzie, 
1990). 
The proponent starts the discussion by giving his standpoint, uttering standpoint(S). The 
opponent is obliged to challenge the standpoint, uttering why(S)? From then on, the proponent, in 
each of his moves, must either give a reason for the lastly challenged statement, because(T), or 
 
1
 The model resembles Krabbe’s model for metadialogues (2003). Krabbe specifies a model in which the parties are 
constructing an ‘accepted ground level dialogue.’ A move by a party is added to this dialogue if the permissibility of 
the move remains undisputed or if the party wins a metadialogue in which the move’s permissibility is examined. 
2
 The model might be extended by enabling the antagonist to anticipatory moves as well. 
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give up the discussion, I give up. The opponent must in every move either (1) respond to the 
argument at the last stage by (1a) challenging its basic reason, why(T)? or by (1b) challenging its 
connection premise, uttering why(T → S)?, or (2) give up the discussion, I give up. If a party 
gives up, he or she loses the basic discussion while the other party wins it. A basic discussion 
ending with I give up counts as concluded. The opponent will not be allowed to challenge a 
premise if the premise is an element of her set of commitments.  
In a constructive discussion, the protagonist and the antagonist construct one or more 
basic discussions. The parties take turns such that each turn is made up of a number of moves to 
be added to the basic discussions under development. The protagonist takes primary 
responsibility for playing the part of proponent while the antagonist’s prime concern is the 
opponent. There are two speech acts that are exclusive for a constructive discussion. A collection 
of moves expressed within a turn is followed by either the speech act of finishing a turn, your 
turn, or of making a winning remark, I win. If the one party has finished a turn, it’s the other 
party’s turn. If one party makes a winning remark he or she wins the constructive discussion and 
the other party loses it. In a concluding stage the parties balance the pros and cons by checking 
whether the initiated basic discussions have been concluded and in whose favor they have been 
concluded. The rule for the concluding stage, governing the speech act of making a winning 
remark, will be discussed in the next section.  
A straightforward way of arguing in a constructive discussion is by letting the protagonist 
fulfill the role of proponent only and letting the antagonist fulfill the role of opponent only, and 
by developing just one basic discussion. Alternately protagonist and antagonist add a single 
move to the one basic discussion under construction. For instance, the protagonist as a proponent 
puts forward standpoint a and finishes his turn, the antagonist as an opponent challenges a and 
finishes her turn, the protagonist as a proponent gives a reason b for a and finishes his turn, etc. 
A contribution becomes more complex when the protagonist anticipates a critical 
response: (1) the protagonist as a proponent presents a reason or standpoint, (2) the protagonist 
as an opponent challenges this reason, (3) the protagonist as a proponent offers a reason for the 
challenged statement, after which the protagonist finishes his turn (see the protagonist’s 
contribution in the diagram below). In a different way the antagonist can make the discussion 
more involved. If in a basic discussion a statement S has been argued for by a statement T then 
there are two directions in which the basic discussion may develop: the direction starting with a 
challenge of T and the direction starting with a challenge of T→S. In a constructive discussion 
the antagonist is allowed to pursue both options and to construe two basic discussions by 
challenging both T as well as T→S. This kind of complexity can also be introduced by the 
protagonist if he chooses to anticipate two critical responses to one argument. 
 
Protagonist: proponent:  standpoint(a) 
  opponent: why(a)? 
  proponent: because(b)  
  your turn 
Antagonist: opponent: why(b)? 
  opponent: why(b → a)?  
  your turn 
 
The configuration of basic discussions composed in the constructive discussion can be 
conveniently represented with a profile of dialogue. In the first turn, one basic discussion has 
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been developed comprising three stages. In the second turn, these three stages become part of 
two distinct basic discussions (see the profile below).  
The opponent in a basic discussion can dispute the lastly presented argument in two 
ways. In order to refer to distinct basic discussions the following convention is adopted. The 
basic critical discussion that is initiated at the first few stages by the proponent and opponent is 
called basic critical discussion 1, or bcd 1. The first time when either the antagonist or the 
protagonist as opponent introduces a move at some fourth stage, this move is part of bcd 1.1 
(regardless of whether the move contains a challenge of the reason or of the connection premise). 
The second time a challenge is put forward at stage 4, that challenge is part of bcd 1.2 (bcd 1.2 
can also be constructed in a later turn by one of the parties). Bcd 1 is then considered as the 
initial part of both bcd 1.1 and of bcd 1.2. More generally, if a bcd i (where i is a row of 
occurrences of 1 and 2, starting with 1) at stage j is extended with a move at stage j+1 that 
contains a challenge then that move is located at stage j+1 of bcd i.1, unless there is already a 
move j+1 at bcd 1.1 in which case it is located at stage j+1 of bcd i.2.  
 
stage 1 Proponent:  bcd 1   standpoint(a) 
 
stage 2 Opponent: bcd 1   why(a)? 
 
stage 3 Proponent: bcd 1   because(b) 
 
stage 4 Opponent: bcd 1.1 why(b)? bcd 1.2 Opponent: why(b → a)? 
 
Real discussion often develop in several directions simultaneously. The distinction between 
constructive and basic discussion enables us to model this feature. Due to a plethora of sides or 
aspects being at issue at the same time, these discussion are often difficult to absorb. In an ideal 
kind of constructive discussion, however, complex contributions remain transparent throughout.  
For constructive discussions we can define one-sided argument in the following way.  
 
Definition of protagonist’s argument at turn t: 
The protagonist’s argument at turn t is the constellation of standpoint, reasons and connection 
premises put forward by the protagonist at turn t and at earlier turns.  
 
Definition of one-sided argument at turn t: 
The protagonist’s argument at turn t is one-sided if and only if at the end of turn t, either there is 
a reason or connection premise that can (given the rules for constructive discussion) still be 
challenged by the opponent, or if there is a basic reason or connection premise that has already 
been challenged but has not yet been supported with an argument.3  
 
 
3
 Walton uses the notion of one-sidedness to provide a dialectical explication of ‘bias.’ I consider bias to be a 
possible, but not a necessary ground of one-sidedness in argumentation. ‘[A] biased argument can be defined simply 
as a one-sided argument - an argument that lacks the balance necessary for it to be two-sided. (...) A one-sided 
argument continually engages in pro-argumentation for the position supported and continually rejects the arguments 
of the opposed side in a dialogue. A two-sided (balanced) argument considers all arguments on both sides of a 
dialogue. (...) A balanced argument considers all the other arguments that have been opposed to it in a dialogue and 
reaches a summary judgment on which side (as a whole) has the stronger case’ (Walton 1999, pp. 76-77). 
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By having not (yet) dealt with at least one critical question that the opponent may still raise, a 
one-sided argument is, by definition, a (still) incomplete argument that supports the standpoint 
insufficiently at that point of the discussion: the other side of the issue and at least one side of the 
subject has not yet been dealt with adequately. 
The definiens explicates the pre-theoretical idea of failing to deal with objections that 
might plausibly be raised by a member of the intended audience. One-sidedness is a notion 
relative to a particular discussion with a particular antagonist. One and the same argument can be 
one-sided in the one discussion while being fully responsive in a discussion with a party having 
other commitments. The notion is also relative to a phase of a discussion. Normally, arguments 
develop gradually. An argument can be one-sided in an earlier phase of the discussion while 
becoming more balanced as the dialogue proceeds.4 
According to this definition, many arguments are one-sided, but not all are. An argument 
is not one-sided at some turn (but responsive5) if the opponent has at that point no legal option of 
challenging one of the premises of the argument. This situation arises when all sentences 
expressing yet unchallenged premises of the protagonist’s argument at that stage are within the 
opponent’s set of commitments. So, a precondition for applying the definition to real arguments 
is that the analyst has a sufficiently complete hypothesis regarding the opponent’s commitments 
at his disposal.  
 
4. LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CASES 
 
One-sidedness can be beneficial for the purpose of conflict resolution, but only at certain phases 
of a controversy. To encourage the protagonist to take account of and incorporate fruitful ideas 
from the antagonist, an exchange of still incomplete and insufficient arguments must take place 
in the argumentation stage, before the discussion is closed off. Requiring the protagonist to 
anticipate all relevant criticisms at this stage would violate the dialectical division of labor. On 
the other hand, one-sidedness can also endanger the balance aimed at in critical discussion. If 
questions remain unanswered, the parties will decide on the standpoint’s acceptability without 
having recourse to all pros and cons. Only in the concluding stage the parties must draw up the 
balance-sheet and decide who has been defending the most plausible position.  
So, whether the one-sidedness of an argument is legitimate or not can only be answered 
after taking another feature of constructive critical discussion into account. The dialectical 
obligations of an arguer must be specified for each stage of a critical discussion (Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (2004), unlike Johnson (2000)). In Walton’s view (1999, p.187) the legitimacy 
of one-sidedness in argumentation depends on the type of dialogue the parties are engaged in and 
on the purpose the argumentation serves. Restricting attention to critical discussion, we may 
consider a one-sided argument illegitimately one-sided if the protagonist also conveys the 
pretense, whether explicitly or implicitly, to have concluded the discussion in his own favor. By 
acting as if there is no other option for the opponent than to give up at every possible 
 
4
 The definition can be refined by making it a gradual notion: an argument at turn u is less one-sided than the 
argument at stage t only if the set of critical questions answered at stage t is a real subset of the set of critical 
questions answered at stage u. 
5
 ‘Balance’ seems to connote more than just not being one-sided. It adds to the balance (or at least the appearance of 
it) if the protagonist acknowledges strong points of the antagonist’s position instead of only providing counter 
criticisms. So a typical ingredient of an argument that is perceived as ‘balanced’ would be: ‘I acknowledge the 
importance of your objection A. However, ...’  An argument’s being one-sided is just one way of its being 
unbalanced. The importance of acknowledgement is not modeled by the model for constructive critical discussion. 
JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR 
 
304 
 
development of the current basic discussions, the protagonist makes the opponent’s position 
weaker than it really is. 
In line with the term concluding stage, we will call an argument a concluding argument if 
an arguer offers an argument and in addition expresses the pretence to have resolved the dispute 
in his own favor (and won the discussion) by offering these lines of reasoning. A concluding 
argument will be analyzed as contributing partly to the argumentation stage as well as partly to 
the concluding stage of a constructive discussion.  
In order to clarify the notion of a concluding argument further, we must distinguish 
between the concluding stage of a basic and the concluding stage of a constructive discussion. A 
basic discussion is concluded by an occurrence of the remark I give up by either the opponent or 
the proponent. This move ends a basic discussion. Within constructive discussion, the 
protagonist as a proponent has a right to give up a basic discussion. Likewise, the antagonist as 
an opponent may concede defeat. Yet, in special situations the protagonist is allowed to 
anticipate the opponent’s giving up a basic discussion, namely in cases where there is no 
plausible way for the opponent to respond critically towards the lastly presented argument. For 
example, if the proponent in a basic discussion supports b with reason a while the opponent is 
committed both to a and to a → b, the protagonist is allowed, as an opponent, to utter I give up 
(where I refers to the opponent).  
The concluding stage of a constructive discussion is constituted by the utterance of I win, 
by either the antagonist or the protagonist. The antagonist should be allowed to utter I win only if 
at least one basic discussion as constructed until then has ended with the proponent’s uttering I 
give up.6 The antagonist then wins the constructive discussion as a whole, while the protagonist 
loses it. The protagonist is allowed to utter I win and to win the constructive discussion, in case 
every basic discussion as constructed until then has been finished and if every basic discussion 
ends with the opponent’s utterance of I give up. If neither of these conclusions can be derived, 
the constructive discussion remains undecided yet.7  
The kind of norm that is violated when the protagonist fails to anticipate plausible 
challenges but all the same presents his argument as concluding, is different in kind from the 
rules that distribute rights and obligations among opponent and proponent. Those rules explicate 
what it means to resolve an issue at the level of performing elementary dialectical speech acts. 
The rule for excluding illegitimate one-sidedness has to do with combining elementary moves by 
the protagonist: first, combining critical questions with answers to them, and second, combining 
such arguments with a claim to have resolved the discussion in one’s favor. Illegitimate one-
sidedness can best be analyzed as a violation of a rule for constructive discussion, rather than of 
basic discussion. The fallacy of presenting a fallaciously one-sided argument can be defined in 
the following manner: 
 
The protagonist’s argument at turn t is fallaciously one-sided if and only if the argument 
is one-sided at t and the protagonist at t nevertheless makes a winning remark, I win. 
If the antagonist is committed to d, d→(b→ a), e, e→c, f, f→(c→b), the following exchange 
would be an example of a constructive discussion: 
 
6
 The model, as it stands, does not enable the parties to develop multiple argumentation. 
7
 The model does not account for the distinction between refuting one’s antagonist’s arguments perfunctory and 
refuting them after having them presented and examined in a fair-minded and open way (Paul in Walton, 1999, p. 
72).  
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turn 1 Protagonist:  bcd 1  stage 1  proponent standpoint(a) 
    your turn 
turn 2 Antagonist:  bcd 1  stage 2  opponent why(a)? 
    your turn 
turn 3 Protagonist:  bcd 1  stage 3  proponent because(b) 
    your turn 
turn 4 Antagonist:   bcd 1.1 stage 4  opponent why(b)? 
    bcd 1.2 stage 4  opponent why(b→ a)?  
    your turn 
turn 5 Protagonist:  bcd 1.1 stage 5  proponent because(c) 
    bcd 1.2 stage 5  proponent because(d) 
    bcd 1.1 .1 stage 6  opponent why(c)? 
    bcd 1.1.1 stage 7  proponent because(e) 
    bcd 1.1 .2 stage 6  opponent why(c → b)? 
    bcd 1.1 .2 stage 7  proponent because(f) 
    bcd 1.1.1 stage 8  opponent I give up 
    bcd 1.1.2 stage 8  opponent I give up 
    bcd 1.2 stage 6  opponent I give up 
    I win 
 
Example (continued): 
‘Saddam Hussein shipped thousands of tubes supposedly destined for Iraqi uranium centrifuges, 
so it is fully clear by now that he is rebuilding his nuclear weapons program.’ We suppose the 
commitment store of the opponent not to contain any of these propositions. 
Protagonist:  proponent:  standpoint (he is rebuilding his nuclear weapons program) 
Antagonist:  opponent:  why (is he rebuilding his nuclear weapons program)? 
Protagonist:  proponent:  because (Saddam Hussein shipped thousands of tubes 
    supposedly destined for Iraqi uranium centrifuges) 
  *I win* 
That the protagonist pretends to be in the position to conclude the discussion in his favor is 
indicated by ‘so it is fully clear by now that...’ Because the opponent may still raise two critical 
questions, the protagonist’s last move I win is illegitimate.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The two-layered model for constructive critical discussion provides a device for analyzing one-
sided arguments, and for distinguishing between legitimate and fallacious instances. A one-sided 
argument can be defined as an argument, as developed by the protagonist at some stage of a 
constructive discussion, that does not deal with every relevant critical question that the opponent 
has raised or may still raise. The fallacy of offering a one-sided argument can be understood as a 
violation of a rule for concluding the constructive exchange of complex arguments and 
criticisms. It has been shown also that the degree of complexity that is typical of arguments said 
to be one-sided can be dealt with within formal dialectic. 
The model can be extended by accommodating the antagonist’s anticipating particular 
arguments by the protagonist. This enables the explication of the notion of one-sided criticism. 
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The idea of a two-layered model such as Constructive Critical Discussion might also prove 
useful for some other issues in the theory of argument. The two-layered model might be applied 
to other fallacies: for instance, the straw man fallacy might be seen as an illegitimate move by 
either the protagonist as an opponent or by the antagonist as a proponent. Further, the distinction 
between layers might clarify Johnson’s distinction between objection and criticism (2000, 2001). 
An objection can be seen as a kind of move by the opponent in a basic discussion. A criticism is 
then to be understood as a broader notion referring to critical contributions by the antagonist or 
protagonist in a constructive discussion. For instance, if the antagonist helps the protagonist to 
play the part of proponent by suggesting an argument, she can be said be criticize the way the 
protagonist fulfills his dialectical duties (Van Laar, 2004). 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Barstow, D., Broad W.J. & Gerth, J.: 2004, October 3, ‘How White House embraced suspect Iraq arms intelligence’, 
The New York Times, p. 1.1. 
Blair, J.Anthony: 1998, ‘The limits of the dialogue model of argument’, in Argumentation 12. pp. 325-339.  
Eemeren, Frans H. Van & Grootendorst, Rob: 2004, A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical 
approach. Cambridge: University Press. 
Govier, Trudy: 1998, ‘Are there two sides to every question?’, in T. Govier (ed.), Selected issues in logic and 
communication. pp. 43-54. Wadsworth CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Hamblin, Charles L.: 1970, Fallacies. Virginia: Vale Press. 
Johnson, Ralph H.: 2000a, Manifest rationality: a pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Johnson, Ralph H.: 2000b, ‘More on arguers and their dialectical obligations’, in C.W. Tindale, H.V. Hansen & E. 
Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the century’s turn (Proceedings of the 4th conference of the Ontario Society 
for the Study of Argumentation, CD-Rom.) Windsor, Ontario: OSSA. 
Krabbe, Erik C.W.: 2000, ‘Ralph H. Johnson’s More on Arguers and Dialectical Obligations’, In C.W. Tindale, 
H.V. Hansen & E. Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the century’s turn (Proceedings of the 4th conference of the 
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, CD-Rom.) Windsor, Ontario: OSSA. 
Krabbe, Erik C.W.: 2002, ‘Strategies in Dialectic and Rhetoric’, In H.V. Hansen, C.W. Tindale, J.A. Blair, R.H. 
Johnson & R.C. Pinto, Argumentation and its Applications (CD-ROM, Proceedings from the Conference of 
The Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, May 17-19, 2001, University of Windsor, Windsor, 
Ontario). 
Krabbe, Erik C.W.: 2003,  ‘Metadialogues’, Van Eemeren, F.H., Blair, J.A., Willard, C.A. & Snoeck Henkemans, 
A.F. (eds.). Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. 
Amsterdam: SicSat. 641-644. 
Laar, Jan Albert Van: 2004, ‘Jezelf benadelen met dubbelzinnig taalgebruik’, in: Tijdschrift voor taalbeheersing, 26, 
pp. 105-115. 
Mackenzie, Jim: 1990, ‘Four Dialogue Systems’, Studia Logica, 49. pp. 567-583. 
Walton, Douglas N.: 1999, One-sided arguments: a dialectical analysis of bias. Albany, N.Y.: State University of 
New York Press. 
Walton, Douglas N. & Krabbe, Erik C.W.: 1995, Commitment in dialogue: basic concepts of interpersonal 
reasoning. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. 
